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Arkansas Attorney General's Monthly Opinions

It's important to know the opinions from Arkansas Attorney General Tim Griffin’s office especially for local governments and citizens.

Photo by Luis Caroca / Unsplash

Arkansas Attorney General Tim Griffin publishes a monthly digest of recently issued opinions.

Clicking on the opinion numbers in this digest will take you to the full opinion.

OPINION 2025-052
Requested by State Representative Richard McGrew

Question: Would Hot Springs Village qualify, be eligible to participate in, and receive loan funds pursuant to and as outlined in Act 736 of 2025?

Brief Response: As an unincorporated community, Hot Springs Village lacks legal status, so it cannot become a water authority. But its Property Owners Association, as a nonprofit corporation, could become eligible to form or convert to a water authority under the conditions discussed in the opinion.

OPINION 2025-054
Requested by State Senator Ronald Caldwell

Question 1: Does the retroactive exemption deadline of April 9, 2025, found in Act 945 of 2025, violate article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution on the grounds that:
a. It precedes the effective date of the Act;
b. It precedes the Public Service Commission rulemaking deadline; and
c. The General Assembly did not include an emergency clause to justify the retroactivity?

Brief Response: No. Nothing in Article 5, § 1 of the Arkansas Constitution prohibits retroactive laws.

Question 2: If the answer to Question 1 is no, is the retroactive exemption deadline of April 9, 2025, otherwise not applicable to a wind energy project that executed land lease agreements after April 9, 2025, (but before the effective date of the Act) in light of Attorney General Opinion No. 91-101 and both the fact that:
a. The exemption date still precedes the effective date of the Act; and
b. The absence of an emergency clause undermines any claim of necessity for retroactive application?

Brief Response: Yes, wind energy projects that executed land leases after April 9, 2025, but before the Act’s effective date of August 5, 2025, do not qualify for the exemption.

Question 3: If the answer is yes to either or both of the foregoing questions, would a wind energy project that executes leases prior to the finalization of the Public Service Commission’s rulemaking be exempt from the Act?

Brief Response: No, executing leases before the Public Service Commission’s rules are finalized does not exempt wind energy projects from the Act’s requirements.

OPINION 2025-058
Requested by State Representative DeAnn Vaught

Question 1: When the county judge enacts an Act 9 bond and/or Payment in Lieu of Tax (PILOT) agreement with a company or other entity, is he acting in his executive capacity or his judicial capacity?

Brief Response: When issuing an Act 9 bond or entering into a PILOT agreement with a company or other entity, the county judge acts in a judicial capacity as the sole member of the county court.

Question 2: Can the county judge enter into an Act 9 bond and/or PILOT agreement without an ordinance or resolution from the quorum court?

Brief Response: Yes. As the legislative branch of the county, the quorum court plays no role in issuing an Act 9 bond or entering a PILOT agreement.

Question 3: Can a quorum court overrule a county judge’s signature on an Act 9 bond and/or PILOT agreement?

Brief Response: No. Under A.C.A. § 14-14-502(c), the quorum court cannot “exercise any power” belonging to the county court without the county court’s express permission.

OPINION 2025-076
Requested by State Senator Breanne Davis

Question 1: Does the law require a council member, who has requested consideration for an appointment to fill a vacancy in a municipal office, to recuse himself or herself from participating and voting on a third party’s nomination for appointment to that position?

Question 2: Does the law require the spouse of a council member, who happens to serve on the same council and who has advocated for the consideration of and appointment of his or her spouse to fill a vacant office, to recuse himself or herself from participating in a vote on the nomination of a third party to fill that same position?

Brief Response: To answer the first two questions together—while no statute or constitutional provision directly addresses the scenario you have described, a common law conflict of interest or A.C.A. § 21-8-304(a) may apply. But whether participating in a vote on the nomination of a third party would violate § 21-8-304 or other ethics law depends on specific facts. The Arkansas Ethics Commission has authority to review fact-specific scenarios, issue ethics opinions, and enforce A.C.A. § 21-8-304.

Question 3: If the answer to either of the above questions is yes, would such recusals reduce the number of members required for determining a majority? For example, if the law requires two (2) members of a five (5) member body of the whole council to abstain from participating in a vote, would the law consider affirmative votes of two (2) of the remaining three (3) members to constitute a majority for purposes of filling a vacancy?

Brief Response: No. A majority vote is based on the total number of members elected to the council, not just the members who are present and voting on the matter at issue. Therefore, three affirmative votes would still be required on a five-member council, even if two members abstain.

OPINION 2025-077
Requested by State Representative Rick McClure

Question 1: Can a medical clinic claim business personal property tax exemption status by stating the underlying property was purchased with federal grant money?

Brief Response: No, a medical clinic cannot claim a business personal property tax exemption solely because the property was purchased with federal grant funds. But it may qualify for the public charity exemption provided by the Arkansas Constitution.

Question 2: Does a medical clinic lose or jeopardize its tax-exempt status if it bills for its services rendered and turns delinquent accounts over to collection agents?

Brief Response: No, a medical clinic does not lose or jeopardize its tax-exempt status simply by billing patients or referring delinquent accounts to collection agencies, provided that those patients have the ability to pay and any profits are used to support or expand the clinic’s charitable mission.

OPINION 2025-081
Requested by State Representative Les Warren

Question 1: What state agency or entity is the successor in interest to the Arkansas Resources and Development Commission?

Brief Response: The Arkansas Economic Development Commission is the successor in interest to the Arkansas Resources and Development Commission with respect to the quitclaim deed recorded in Deed Record Book No. 383, pages 360–367.

Question 2: What state agency or entity has or should have the legal authority to release and/or convey a public or pipeline easement?

Brief Response: The Arkansas Economic Development Commission has legal authority to release or convey the pipeline easement.

OPINION 2025-083
Requested by State Representative Steve Unger

Question: Under A.C.A. § 12-15-302, does a sheriff have to receive approval from the county judge to award the retiring deputy his issued pistol as required under A.C.A. § 12-15-301, or does A.C.A. § 12-15-302 allow a sheriff to make this decision on his own without approval from the county judge?

Brief Response: Under A.C.A. § 12-15-302, a county sheriff may award a retiring deputy sheriff the pistol carried by the deputy at the time of his or her retirement without obtaining approval from the county judge.

OPINION 2025-116
Requested by Ms. Jana Bradford

Question: Under A.C.A. §§ 16-21-146(a) and 16-21-156(1), is a quorum court required to appropriate county funds for the salaries and benefits of existing support staff positions within the prosecuting attorney’s office?

Brief Response: In my opinion, the administrative and victim services positions do not qualify as “existing support staff” under A.C.A. § 16-21-156 unless they existed at the time of the county’s 1999 appropriation. If those positions existed then, they qualify as “existing support staff” under A.C.A. § 16-21-156, and the county quorum court must appropriate salaries and benefits for the positions at levels sufficient for the office’s operation. If the positions did not exist then, the quorum court retains discretion under A.C.A. § 16-21-156(2) to appropriate funds for the positions.

OPINION 2025-123
Requested by Mr. S. Kyle Hunter

Question 1: Is Act 24 of 2025 in conflict with the Arkansas Constitution as it relates to not paying the county judge and justices of the peace until an annual appropriation ordinance is passed by the Quorum Court?

Question 2: If withholding pay as required by Act 24 of 2025 is constitutional, should the county judge and justices of the peace be retroactively paid to the first of the year after passage of the budget ordinance?

Brief Response: A reading of Act 24 of 2025 that prohibits back pay would render the act unconstitutional under Amendment 55, § 5, because it would decrease the compensation of the county judge during his current term. An alternative but permissible reading of the act does not decrease compensation. Because one interpretation of Act 24 of 2025 would render the act unconstitutional, while another would not, one must opt for the constitutional reading. Therefore, the county judge and justices of the peace are entitled to back pay once an annual appropriation ordinance is adopted.

OPINION 2025-127
Requested by Mr. Dave Neal

Question: Is the custodian’s decision to release the requested records consistent with the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)?

Brief Response: The voluntary separation form and resignation letter are best classified as personnel records, and the email and memorandum are best classified as employee-evaluation records. In my opinion, the custodian’s decision to release these records is consistent with the FOIA. The record containing information printed from the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration’s website appears to be neither a personnel record nor an employee-evaluation record. Thus, it falls outside the scope of my review under A.C.A. § 25-19-105(c)(3)(B)(i).

OPINION 2025-128
Requested by Ms. Jennifer Waymack Standerfer

Question: Request for review and certification of the popular name and ballot title of a proposed constitutional amendment with the popular name, “The Natural Environment Amendment.”

Brief Response: Having reviewed the text of your proposed initiated amendment, as well as your proposed popular name and ballot title, I have concluded that I must reject your proposed popular name and ballot title and instruct you to redesign them. Problems in the text of your proposed amendment prevent me from (1) ensuring your ballot title is not misleading or (2) substituting a more appropriate ballot title.

OPINION 2025-130
Requested by Mr. Adam Fogleman, Pulaski County Attorney

Question: Are the custodian’s decisions to withhold original, unsolicited complaints by coworkers consistent with the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)?

Brief Response: In my opinion, the custodian’s decisions are partially consistent with the FOIA. As discussed in the opinion, unsolicited complaints regarding coworkers or supervisors are personnel records. A supervisor’s incident reports, memoranda, and transcripts of investigations are “preliminary notes and other materials.” Thus, they are exempt from disclosure when the four-part test for release of employment evaluations is met. Finally, Pulaski County’s Personnel Policy is administrative in nature, and employee complaints submitted under that policy are not considered to be “at the behest” of the County.

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