Arkansas Attorney General's Monthly Opinions

Arkansas Attorney General Tim Griffin publishes a monthly digest of recently issued opinions.

Clicking on the opinion numbers in this digest will take you to the full opinion.

OPINION 2025-095
Requested by State Representative Mark D. McElroy

Question 1: Under Arkansas law, is it permissible for an individual to run for a position on a school board as well as a position as mayor or a position on a city council simultaneously?

Brief Response: Yes. When A.C.A. § 7-5-111 is read harmoniously with other general election laws, the “district” used in the statute is not a “school district.”

Question 2: If the response to question one is negative, what happens should an individual file for both a position on the school board and for another elected office?

Brief Response: Please see my response to your first question.

Question 3: Under Arkansas law, are there any situations where an individual can be elected and serve in two or more elected positions or capacities?

Brief Response: Yes. An individual may be elected and serve as a school board member, while simultaneously serving as either a mayor or city council member.

OPINION 2025-104
Requested by State Representative Stetson C. Painter

Question 1: Under A.C.A. § 6-21-816 (Sale or lease of public school facilities), should regular-season broadcast rights to high school football games, which are a public asset of intellectual property belonging to the school district, be treated like other valuable property, such as real property, of the district, and therefore subject to the cited code section since statutorily significant monetary value of said intellectual property has been established by an outside private party operating as an agent on the school’s behalf in selling such property?

Brief Response: No, A.C.A. § 6-21-816 applies only to the sale or lease of physical public school facilities or real property—not to intangible intellectual property like broadcasting rights. But article 14, section 2 of the Arkansas Constitution requires that school district property—including intellectual property—be used for the benefit of the school district.

Question 2: May a school district allow an outside third-party entity (such as an advertising agency) to represent it in such financial matters without employing the bidding process to provide that service and selecting the appropriate bidder?

Brief Response: Yes, a school district may hire an advertising agency without soliciting competitive bids under A.C.A. § 6-21-304 if the cost is under $20,000 or if the service qualifies as a personal or professional service, which is exempt from the bidding requirement.

Question 3: May a school district allow some or all proceeds from the sale of its intellectual/real property (broadcasting rights) to go directly to an outside private third party (such as a booster club) with such funds not passing through, nor being accounted for, in district coffers?

Brief Response: Yes, a school district may permit a third party, such as a booster club, to keep proceeds it raises from using district-owned intellectual property—like broadcasting rights—provided that the arrangement is authorized by the school district and provides a benefit to the school district.

OPINION 2025-109
Requested by State Representative Ron McNair

Question: Based upon an underlying contractual agreement between the Federal Highway Safety Grants Program and a law enforcement agency to have its officers work specialized shifts for set pay, does the 80-hour threshold of actual work apply to the officer receiving payment for services rendered?

Brief Response: I cannot opine on the terms of any contract. But neither Arkansas law nor federal law requires overtime to be paid until an employee actually works beyond the applicable overtime threshold during the relevant pay period.

OPINION 2025-112
Requested by President Jay B. Silveria, University of Arkansas System

Question 1: Is Act 573 constitutional as applied to a public institution of higher education under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Question 2: Does it constitute unlawful religious discrimination against employees or students who are atheistic, agnostic, or followers of religions other than Protestant Christianity under federal law (such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) or state law (such as the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 or A.C.A. § 16-123-601 et seq.) for an institution of higher education to conduct classes and other activities in rooms where posters of the Ten Commandments have been installed pursuant to the Act?

Question 3: Under state or federal law, where a poster required under the Act has been installed in a classroom, library, or other space where an employee of the institution works, is an Arkansas public institution of higher education legally required and authorized to grant a religious accommodation of removal of the poster for an employee who objects to the presence of the poster because it conflicts with the sincerely held religious or personal beliefs of the employee?

Question 4: Under state or federal law, where a poster required under the Act has been installed in a classroom, library, or other space where a student takes classes or studies, is an Arkansas public institution of higher education legally required and authorized to grant a religious accommodation of removal of the poster for a student who objects to the presence of the poster because it conflicts with the sincerely held religious or personal beliefs of the student?

Brief Response: I must respectfully decline to opine on your questions because of pending litigation, the outcome of which could directly affect the issues you raised. It is the long-standing policy of the Office of the Attorney General, as a member of the executive branch, to decline to opine on matters that are pending before the courts for resolution. Please see the attached brief I recently filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. As the arguments in the brief make clear, I believe Act 573 is constitutional.

OPINION 2025-115
Requested by State Representative Matthew K. Brown

Question 1: Under Arkansas and federal law, may a SNAP-authorized retailer lawfully round up or down to the nearest nickel when providing change to a SNAP recipient during a non-SNAP cash transaction while charging the exact amount for the SNAP-eligible portion of the transaction? For example, when a SNAP recipient purchases both SNAP-eligible and SNAP-ineligible items, the transaction must be processed as two separate transactions. Because the SNAP portion of the transaction is electronic, the exact amount of the transaction is charged. However, if a SNAP customer chooses to pay cash for the non-SNAP portion of the transaction, may the retailer lawfully round the cash transaction to the nearest nickel?

Brief Response: Neither Arkansas nor federal law specifically prohibits a retailer from rounding the cash portion of a mixed SNAP transaction to the nearest nickel, as long as the SNAP-eligible portion is charged electronically at the exact amount. The key federal requirement is that businesses accepting SNAP payments cannot treat customers who use SNAP coupons differently from those who use cash. To comply with federal SNAP law, a business may consider rounding all non-cash transactions (including SNAP transactions) in the same manner as it rounds cash transactions. But a detailed analysis of federal law is outside the scope of an Attorney General opinion.

Question 2: Under Arkansas law, is there a preferred method for providing change during a cash transaction with a SNAP recipient?

Brief Response: No. Arkansas law does not prescribe any particular method for providing change to SNAP recipients during cash transactions.

Question 3: In general, are there any other laws or regulations which prohibit a retailer from rounding cash transactions to the nearest nickel while charging credit, debit, or check transactions to the exact penny?

Brief Response: Because Arkansas law does not expressly require cash and credit card transactions to be treated identically, penny rounding for cash transactions likely does not, by itself, violate other Arkansas laws. Retailers should still review the applicable sales tax law and surcharge restrictions, if any, on credit and debit transactions to ensure compliance.

OPINION 2025-118
Requested by Ms. Sherri Latimer

Question: Request for review and approval of a Memorandum of Agreement between the City of Little Rock, the City of North Little Rock, and Pulaski County.

Brief Response: After reviewing the Memorandum of Agreement, I have determined that the Interlocal Cooperation Act does not apply; therefore, my approval is not required.

OPINION 2025-120
Requested by State Representative Jeffrey Reed Wardlaw

Question: Under Arkansas law and pursuant to A.C.A. § 5-54-102, is a suspect required to present, produce, or show his or her identification to a law enforcement officer before an offense can be charged or ticketed?

Brief Response: No, a suspect is not required to present, produce, or show his or her identification to a law enforcement officer before an offense for obstructing governmental operations under A.C.A. § 5-54-102 can be charged or ticketed.

OPINION 2025-125
Requested by State Representative Les Warren

Question 1: May Tax Collectors require real, personal property, and other tax payments be made with exact change?

Question 2: May Tax Collectors require real, personal property, and other tax payments be made only through and by electronic payment?

Question 3: Under Arkansas law, are Tax Collectors allowed to operate a cashless office?

Brief Response: To answer the first three questions together, neither federal nor state law—constitutional, statutory, or regulatory—prohibits county officials from requiring exact change or mandates that they accept cash payments.

Question 4: Should tax payments, assessments, dues, or other payments be rounded to the nearest nickel due to the pending elimination of the penny?

Brief Response: Please see Attorney General Opinion 2025-115, which addresses the laws relevant to rounding transactions.

OPINION 2025-132
Requested by Chief Elder Ean Lee Bordeaux

Question: Is the custodian’s decision to release the requested records with certain redactions consistent with the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)?

Brief Response: In my opinion, the custodian’s decision to release the records as redacted is mostly consistent with the FOIA. Assuming that the four-part test for release of evaluation records has not been met, the custodian has properly withheld those portions of records deemed evaluation records. Some employees clearly have a substantial privacy interest in the information contained in the complaints, which justifies redacting their names under the personnel records balancing test. But whether other employees whose names were redacted under the balancing test have a heightened privacy interest is less clear. The custodian must assess each complaint individually to determine whether disclosing employees’ names would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

OPINION 2026-002
Requested by Ms. Tiffany Taggart